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Abstract
In E-commerce, advertising is essential for mer-
chants to reach their target users. The typical
objective is to maximize the advertiser’s cumula-
tive revenue over a period of time under a budget
constraint. In real applications, an advertisement
(ad) usually needs to be exposed to the same user
multiple times until the user finally contributes
revenue (e.g., places an order). However, existing
advertising systems mainly focus on the immedi-
ate revenue with single ad exposures, ignoring the
contribution of each exposure to the final conver-
sion, thus usually falls into suboptimal solutions.
In this paper, we formulate the sequential advertis-
ing strategy optimization as a dynamic knapsack
problem. We propose a theoretically guaranteed
bilevel optimization framework, which signifi-
cantly reduces the solution space of the original
optimization space while ensuring the solution
quality. To improve the exploration efficiency of
reinforcement learning, we also devise an effec-
tive action space reduction approach. Extensive
offline and online experiments show the superior
performance of our approaches over state-of-the-
art baselines in terms of cumulative revenue.
1. Introduction
In E-commerce, online advertising plays an essential role
for merchants to reach their target users, in which Real-time
Bidding (RTB) (Zhang et al., 2014; 2016; Zhu et al., 2017)
is an important mechanism. In RTB, each advertiser is al-
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lowed to bid for every individual ad impression opportunity.
Within a period of time, there are a number of impression
opportunities (user requests) arriving sequentially. For each
impression, each advertiser offers a bid based on the impres-
sion value (e.g., revenue) and competes with other bidders
in real-time. The advertiser with the highest bid wins the
auction and thus display ad and enjoys the impression value.
Displaying an ad also associates with a cost: in Generalized
Second-Price (GSP) Auction (Edelman et al., 2007), the
winner is charged for fees according to the second highest
bid. The typical advertising objective for an advertiser is to
maximize its cumulative revenue of winning impressions
over a time period under a fixed budget constraint.
In a digital age, to drive conversion, advertisers can reach
and influence users across various channels such as display
ad, social ad, paid search ad (Ren et al., 2018). As illus-
trated in Figure 9, the user’s decision to convert (purchase a
product) is usually driven by multiple interactions with ads.
Each ad exposure would influence the user’s preferences and
interests, and therefore contributes to the final conversion.
However, existing advertising systems (Yuan et al., 2013;
Zhang et al., 2014; Ren et al., 2017; Zhu et al., 2017; Jin
et al., 2018; Ren et al., 2019) mainly focus on maximizing
the single-step revenue, while ignoring the contribution of
previous exposure to the final conversion, and thus usually
falls into suboptimal solutions. The reason is that simply
optimizing the total immediate revenue cannot guarantee the
maximazation of long-term cumulative revenue. Besides,
there exist some works (Boutilier & Lu, 2016; Du et al.,
2017; Cai et al., 2017; Wu et al., 2018) which optimize
the overall revenue under an extra-long (billions) request
sequence using a single Constrained Markov Decision Pro-
cess (CMDP) (Altman, 1999). However, the optimization
of these methods above is myopic as they ignore the mental
evolution of each user and long-term advertising effects.
The learning is particularly inefficient as well.
Apart from the myopic approaches, there exists some litera-
tures considering the long-term effect of each ad exposure.
Multi-touch attribution (MTA) (Ji & Wang, 2017; Ren et al.,
2018; Du et al., 2019) study the credits assignment to the
previous ad displays before conversion. However, these
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Figure 1. An illustration of the sequential multiple interactions (across different channels) between a user and an ad. Each ad exposure has
long-term influence on the user’s final purchase decision.
methods only attend to figure out the contribution of each
ad exposure, while not providing methods to optimize the
strategies. Besides, since all media channels could affect
users’ conversions, Li et al. (2018); Nuara et al. (2019)
propose multi-channel budget allocation algorithms to help
advertisers understand how particular channels contribute
to user conversions. They optimize the budget allocation
among all channels accordingly to maximize the overall
revenue. However, the granularity of their optimizations is
too coarse. They only optimize the budget allocation in the
channel level and do not specifically optimize the advertis-
ing sequence for each user, which could lead to suboptimal
overall performance.
Considering the shortcomings of existing works, we aim
at optimizing the budget allocation of an advertiser among
all users such that the cumulative revenue of the advertiser
could be maximized, by explicitly taking into consideration
the long-term influence of ad exposures to individual users.
This problem consists of two levels of coupled optimization:
bidding strategy learning for each user and budget alloca-
tion among users, which we termed as Dynamic Knapsack
Problem. Different from traditional Knapsack problem, a
number of challenges arise: 1) Given the estimated long-
term value and cost for each user, the optimization space of
the budget allocation grows exponentially in the number of
users. Besides, since different advertising policies for each
user will lead to different long-term values and costs, the
overall optimization space is extremely large. 2) The long-
term cumulative value and cost for each user are unknown,
which are difficult to make accurate estimations.
To address the above challenges, we propose a novel bilevel
optimization framework: Multi-channel Sequential Bud-
get Constrained Bidding (MSBCB), which transforms the
original bilevel optimization problem into an equivalent
two-level optimization with significantly reduced searching
space. The higher-level only needs to optimize over one
dimensional variable and the lower-level learns the optimal
bidding policy for each user and computes the correspond-
ing optimal budget allocation solution. For the lower-level,
we derive an optimal reward function with theoretical guar-
antee. Besides, we also propose an action space reduction
approach to significantly increase the learning efficiency
of the lower-level. Finally, extensive offline analyses and
online A/B testing conducted on one of the world’s largest
E-commerce platforms, Taobao, show the superior perfor-
mance of our algorithm over state-of-the-art baselines.
2. Formulation: Dynamic Knapsack Problem
Within a time period of k days, we assume that there are
N users {i= 1, ..., N} visiting the E-commerce platform.
Each user may interact with the app multiple times and
trigger multiple advertising requests. During the sequential
interactions between an ad and a user, each ad exposure
could influence the user’s mind and therefore contributes to
the final conversion. Given a fixed ad, for each user i, we
build a separate Markov Decision Process (MDP) (Sutton
& Barto, 2018) to model its sequential interactions with the
same ad. We use pii to denote the advertising policy of the
ad towards user i, which takes user i’s state as input and out-
puts the auction bid. Details of the MDP will be discussed
in Section 3.2. For the fixed ad, we define VG(i|pii) and
VC(i|pii) as the expected long-term cumulative value and
cost for each user i under policy pii. Formally,
VG(i|pii) = E [Gi|pii] = E[
Ti∑
t=0
vt|pii]
VC(i|pii) = E [Ci|pii] = E[
Ti∑
t=0
ct|pii]
(1)
where vt and ct represent the value (i.e., the revenue) and
cost obtained from each request t according to policy pii,
Gi =
∑Ti
t=0 vt and Ci =
∑Ti
t=0 ct represent the long-term
cumulative value and cumulative cost, Ti is the length of
the interaction sequence between user i and the current ad.
Given the above definitions, for an advertiser, our target is
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to maximize its long-term cumulative revenue over k days
under a budget constraint B, which is formulated as:
max
Π
max
X
N∑
i=1
xi VG(i|pii)
s.t.
N∑
i=1
xi VC(i|pii) ≤ B
(2)
where Π={pi1, ..., piN}, X ={x1, ..., xN}, and xi ∈ {0, 1}
indicates whether the user i is selected. Since whether dis-
playing an ad to user i does not have any impact on user
j’s behaviors, VG(i|pii), VC(i|pii) and pii among different
users are independent. Thus, given any fixed advertising
policy Π = {pi1, ..., piN}, VG(i|pii) and VC(i|pii) for each
user i are fixed and the inner optimization of Equation (2)
can be viewed as a classic knapsack problem. The items
to be put into the knapsack is the users. However, differ-
ent advertising policies would lead to different VG(i|pii)s
and VC(i|pii)s for each user, thus here we define Equation
(2) as a Dynamic Knapsack Problem where the value and
cost of each item in the knapsack are dynamic. From the
perspective of optimization, Formulation (2) is a typical
bilevel optimization, where the optimization of Π is em-
bedded (nested) within the optimization of X . This bilevel
optimization is challenging due to the following reasons:
(1) The optimization space of the joint Π is continuous (for
the bid space is continuous). The optimization space of
X is discrete, which grows exponentially in the number
of users (hundreds of millions). Therefore, the solution
space of the combination of Π and X is enormous and
thus is difficult or even impossible to optimize directly.
(2) The value of VG(i|pii) and VC(i|pii) are unknown and
variable, efficient approaches are required to estimate
these values online under limited samples.
3. Methodology: MSBCB Framework
3.1. Bilevel Decomposition and Proof of Correctness
Based on the above analysis, the bilevel optimization (2) is
computationally prohibitive and cannot be solved directly.
In this paper, we first decompose it into an equivalent two-
level sequential optimization process. When taking a fixed
policy Π as input, we denote the optimal solution of the
degraded and static Knapsack Problem as K = KP(Π).
Further, the global optimal solution of Problem (2) could be
defined as:
K∗ = max
pi1,pi2,...,piN
KP(Π) (3)
where pi1, ..., piN are independent variables and K∗ is the
global optimal solution. To obtain K∗, we must firstly
specify the form of the function KP(Π).
When taking a fixed policy Π as input, computing KP(Π)
is a classic static knapsack problem. However, another
challenge in online advertising is that the user requests are
arriving sequentially in real time and thus real-time deci-
sion makings are required. Complicated algorithms (e.g.
dynamic programming) are not applicable due to the incom-
pleteness of all users values and costs.
On the contrary, the Greedy algorithm could compute a
greedy solution without completely knowing the whole set
of candidate users beforehand. We will discuss this latter.
Besides, the Greedy algorithm can achieve nearly optimal
solution in the online advertising (Zhang et al., 2014; Wu
et al., 2018). As proved by Dantzig (1957), if ∀i ∈ 1, ..., N ,
VC(i|pii)≤(1− λ)B, 0≤λ≤1, i.e., the cumulative cost for
each user is much less than the budget, the Greedy algorithm
achieves an approximation ratio of λ, which means the
greedy solution is at least λ times of the optimal solution K.
The closer the λ gets to 1, the higher the quality of the greedy
solution will be. In online advertising, λ is usually greater
than 99.9%. Thus, the greedy solution is approximately
optimal. We provide the detailed data and proof in Section
B.1 of the Appendix. Therefore, in this paper, we refer to
the Greedy algorithm, i.e., KP(Π)← Greedy(Π).
We define CPRi=
VG(i|pii)
VC(i|pii) as the Cost-Performance Ratio
of each user i. The greedy solution is computed by:
(1) Sorting all users according to the Cost-Performance
Ratio CPRi in a descending order;
(2) Pick users from top to bottom until the cumulative cost
violates the budget constraint.
𝑽𝑽𝑮𝑮(𝒊𝒊|𝝅𝝅i) 𝑽𝑽𝑪𝑪(𝒊𝒊|𝝅𝝅𝒊𝒊) 𝐂𝐂𝐂𝐂𝐂𝐂𝒊𝒊 = ⁄𝑽𝑽𝑮𝑮(𝒊𝒊|𝝅𝝅𝒊𝒊) 𝑽𝑽𝑪𝑪(𝒊𝒊|𝝅𝝅𝒊𝒊)
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Figure 2. The solution computing process of the Greedy algorithm.
An illustration is shown in Figure 2. In this example, the bud-
get constraintB = 8. We denote the CPRi of the last picked
user as CPRthr, the threshold of the cost-performance ratio.
In this example, the CPRthr = 7. The advantage is that the
Greedy algorithm only selects users whose CPRi ≥ CPRthr.
If we could estimate the CPRthr beforehand, the Greedy
algorithm could compute the solution online, without com-
pletely knowing the values and costs of all users.
Now that KP(Π)← Greedy(Π) and the Greedy algorithm
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prefers users with larger CPRi (only pick users whose
CPRi ≥ CPRthr), according to Equation 3, to further im-
prove the solution quality, an intuitive way is to optimize pii
for each user i such that each CPRi could be maximized, i.e.,
pi′i = argmaxpii CPRi. However, this intuition is incorrect.
Maximizing the CPRi of each user cannot guarantee that the
greedy solution K=Greedy(Π) could be maximized. Next,
we show that given all users’ CPRs are maximized, we can
still further improve the solution quality by increasing cer-
tain users’ allocated budgets and decreasing their CPRs in
exchange for greater overall cumulative value. Before we
go into the details, we firstly give Lemma 1.
optimal policies �𝜋𝜋i other policies 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖
curve of the optimal V𝑮𝑮(𝒊𝒊|�𝜋𝜋i)V𝑮𝑮(𝒊𝒊|𝝅𝝅𝒊𝒊)
𝑩𝑩𝒊𝒊
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Figure 3. VG(i|pii) is monotonic with VC(i|pii).
Lemma 1. For each user i, the cumulative value VG(i|pii)
increases monotonically with the increase of cost VC(i|pii)
within the range of all possible optimal policies {pii}.
Proof. We assume that the maximum budget allocated to
each user i as Bi ∈ [0, Bmaxi ], where Bmaxi is the maximum
cost user i can consume. Then, for each user i, within the
current budget constraint Bi, the optimal advertising policy
pii must be the one which could maximize the cumulative
value, i.e., pii = argmaxpii VG(i|pii), s.t. VC(i|pii) ≤ Bi.
Obviously, as Bi moves from 0 to Bmaxi , we will get a set
of optimal policies {pii}, whose cost VC(i|pii) and value
VG(i|pii) are both increasing. An illustration is shown in
Figure 3. Thus we complete the proof.
As illustrated in Figure 4, each user’s CPRi (the width of
each rectangular slice) is maximized initially. According to
Lemma 1, for a user i, if we increase VC(i|pii) by ∆VC(i),
i.e., increase the height of user i by ∆VC(i), the corre-
sponding VG(i|pii) will also increase. We denote this in-
crease in value as ∆VG(i). Since there is a budget limit,
a small increased height ∆VC(i) will squeeze out a small
area nearby the CPRthr, whose height is also ∆VC(i) and
width is CPRthr 1. We denote the increased area by re-
shaping user i as ∆V +G = ∆VG(i) and the decreased area
due to extrusion as ∆V −G = CPRthr ∗∆VC(i). Overall, if
∆V +G > ∆V
−
G , the total area will be further increased. For
1Since ∆VC(j) B, the area squeezed out could be consid-
ered as a tiny and smooth change and the width of the last user is
approximately equal to CPRthr
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Figure 4. The x-axis denotes each user’s CPRi and y-axis denotes
the cumulative cost of the Greedy algorithm. All users are sorted
in descending order and arranged from bottom to top. Each rectan-
gular slice’s area (in gray) represents VG(i|pii)=CPRi ∗VC(i|pii),
where CPRi and VC(i|pii) are the width and height. Note that,
the height of each rectangular slice is much less than the budget
constraint, i.e., VC(i|pii)  B. The red dashed line marks the
position of the budget constraint. The total area of all rectangular
slices under the red dashed line constitutes the greedy solution.
any user i, ∆V +G >∆V
−
G yields:
∆VG(i) > CPRthr ∗∆VC(i) (4)
where ∆VG(i) and ∆VC(i) are caused by the change of
pii, e.g., from pi′i to pi
′′
i . We denote ∆VG(i) as VG(i|pi′′i )−
VG(i|pi′i) and ∆VC(i) as VC(i|pi′′i )−VC(i|pi′i). We conclude
that the greedy solution K = Greedy(Π′) can be further
improved if there exists any user i whose current policy pi′i
can be further improved to pi′′i such that ∆VG(i) > CPRthr ∗
∆VC(i). Otherwise, the current solution is optimal. Finally,
we provide the definition of the optimal pi∗i in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1. Under the Greedy paradigm (K=Greedy(Π)),
for any given CPRthr, the optimal advertising policy pi∗i for
each user i is the one which could maximize VG(i|pii) −
CPRthr ∗ VC(i|pii). In other words, pi∗i is defined as:
pi∗i = argmax
pii
[VG(i|pii)− CPRthr ∗ VC(i|pii)] (5)
We denote Π∗ = {pi∗1 , ..., pi∗N}. The corresponding solution
K∗greedy =Greedy(Π
∗) is the optimal Greedy solution of the
Dynamic Knapsack Problem defined in Equation (2).
Proof of Theorem 1. We define Π∗={pi∗1 , ..., pi∗N}, where
pi∗i is defined according to Equation (5), ∀i ∈ {1, ..., N}.
We prove Theorem 1 by contradiction. Given the thresh-
old CPRthr, we firstly assume that Greedy(Π∗) is not the
optimal greedy solution of the Dynamic Knapsack Problem,
which means we could at least find a user i, whose policy pi∗i
could be further improved to policy pi′′i such that the overall
area is increased. This means we could find a better policy
pi′′i for user i such that ∆VG(i) > CPRthr ∗∆VC(i) accord-
ing to Equation (4), where ∆VG(i) = VG(j|pi′′i )−VG(i|pi∗i )
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and ∆VC(i) = VC(i|pi′′i ) − VC(i|pi∗i ) (VG(i|pii) increases
monotonically with the increase of VC(i|pii) according to
Lemma 1). Further, ∆VG(i) > CPRthr ∗∆VC(i) yields:
[VG(i|pi′′i )− CPRthr ∗ VC(i|pi′′i )] >
[VG(i|pi∗i )− CPRthr ∗ VC(i|pi∗i )]
(6)
Equation (6) indicates that
pi∗i 6= argmax
pii
[VG(i|pii)− CPRthr ∗ VC(i|pii)]
which contradicts the definition of pi∗i in Equation (5). Thus,
the theorem statement is obtained.
Algorithm 1 MSBCB Framework.
1: Input: an initial CPRthr;
2: Output: optimal greedy solution of the Dynamic Knap-
sack Problem;
3: for each period until convergence do
4: Taking the current estimated CPRthr as input, the
agent optimizes the advertising policy pii for each
user i according to Section 3.2 and acquires the opti-
mal Π∗ = {pi∗1 , ..., pi∗N}.
5: Based on the current estimated CPRthr and the ob-
tained Π∗, the agent calculates the greedy solution
according to Section 3.3 and collects the actual feed-
back cost and the predefined budget.
6: Update the estimated CPRthr towards CPR∗thr by min-
imizing the gap between the actual feedback cost and
the budget according to Section 3.4.
7: end for
We present the overall MSBCB framework in Algorithm
1, which involves a two-level sequential optimization pro-
cess. (1) Lower-level: Given any CPRthr, we could obtain
the optimal advertising policy Π∗ following Equation 5 of
Theorem 1, which will be discussed in Section 3.2. Then,
based on CPRthr and the optimized Π∗, we could acquire the
Greedy solution by selecting users whose CPRi ≥ CPRthr,
which will be detailed in Section 3.3. (2) Higher-level:
However, the current CPRthr might 6= CPR∗thr, which means
selecting all users whose CPRi ≥ CPRthr might violate the
budget constraint or lead to a substantial budget surplus.
Thus, we optimize the current CPRthr towards CPR∗thr in
Section 3.4. Overall, the optimization space of X is reduced
from 2N to a one-dimensional continuous variable CPRthr.
We conclude that Algorithm 1 could iteratively converge to
a unique and approximate optimal solution. We present the
proof of convergence in Section B.3 of the Appendix.
3.2. Lower-level Advertising Policy Optimization with
Reinforcement Learning
Given a threshold CPRthr as input, we aim to acquire the
optimal advertising policy pi∗i defined in Equation (5) of
Theorem 1. Combining the definitions of VG(i|pii) and
VC(i|pii) with Equation (5), we have
pi∗i = argmax
pii
[VG(i|pii)− CPRthr ∗ VC(i|pii)]
= argmax
pii
(E[Gi|pii]− CPRthr ∗ E[Ci|pii])
= argmax
pii
E [(Gi − CPRthr ∗ Ci) |pii]
= argmax
pii
E[
Ti∑
t=0
(vt − CPRthr ∗ ct)|pii]
(7)
Accordingly, we define rt = vt − CPRthr ∗ ct, i.e., value−
CPRthr ∗ cost, as the immediate profit acquired at each step
t. The objective of Equation (7) is to obtain the optimal
advertising policy pi∗i which could maximize the expected
long-term cumulative profit. To solve this sequential de-
cision making problem, we formulate it as an MDP and
use Reinforcement Learning (RL) (Sutton & Barto, 2018)
techniques to acquire the optimal policy pi∗i .
We consider an episodic MDP, where an episode starts with
the first interaction between a user and an ad, and ends up
with a purchase or exceeding the maximum step Ti as:
• State S: The state st should in principle reflect the
user request status, ad info, user-ad interaction history
info and the RTB environment.
• Action A: The action each agent can take in the RTB
platform is the bid, which is a real number between 0
and the upper bound bidmax, i.e., at ∈ [0, bidmax].
• Reward R(S × A → R): The immediate reward at
step t is defined as rt = vt − CPRthr ∗ ct.
• Transition probability P(S×A×S → [0, 1]): Tran-
sition probability is defined as the probability of state
transitioning from st to st+1 when taking action at.
• Discount factor γ: The bidding agent aims to max-
imize the total discounted reward Rj =
∑Ti
k=t γ rk
from step t onwards, where γ ∈ [0, 1].
For each user i, we define the state-action value function
Q(s, a) = E[Ri|s, a, pii] as the expected cumulative reward
achieved by following the advertising policy pii. The MDP
can be solved using existing Deep Reinforcement Learning
(DRL) algorithms such as DQN (Mnih et al., 2013), DDPG
(Lillicrap et al., 2015) and PPO (Schulman et al., 2017).
After sufficient training, we would acquire the optimized
advertising policies Π∗={pi∗1 , ...pi∗N} for all users.
3.3. Lower-level User Selection by Greedy Algorithm
Taking the current CPRthr and the optimized advertising
policies Π∗ = {pi∗1 , ...pi∗N} as inputs, we aim to obtain the
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greedy solution of the Dynamic Knapsack Problem. In real-
ity, we cannot know all users’ request sequences and their
values and costs beforehand because the user requests are
arriving sequentially in real time. Thus, many complicated
methods depending on the completeness of all users’ data,
e.g., the dynamic programming approach (Martello et al.,
1999), are not applicable. Even the traditional Greedy al-
gorithm cannot be applied either. Fortunately, the greedy
solution could be computed online in an easy way: given
the threshold CPRthr, the agent only has to select users
online whose CPRs are greater than the threshold (an illus-
tration is shown in Figure 2). Therefore, we only have to
estimate the CPRi =
VG(i|pii)
VC(i|pii) for each user i. To acquire
VG(i|pii) and VC(i|pii), besides Q(s,a), we also maintain
two other state value functions VG(s) and VC(s) according
to the Bellman Equation (Sutton & Barto, 2018), where
VG(s) = E[Gj |s, pij ] and VC(s) = E[Cj |s, pij ].
3.4. Higher-level Optimization by Feedback Control
However, the current estimated threshold CPRthr might have
some bias from the optimal CPR∗thr. Thus, selecting all users
whose CPRi ≥ CPRthr might violate the budget constraint
or lead to a substantial budget surplus. Only when the esti-
mated CPRthr is exactly the same with the optimal CPR∗thr,
the actual total advertising cost will be equal to the budget.
To achieve this, we design a feedback control mechanism,
i.e., a PID controller (A˚stro¨m & Ha¨gglund, 1995), to dynam-
ically adjust the CPRthr towards CPR∗thr according to actual
feedback of the overall cost. The core formula is:
CPRthr ∗=
[
1+α1(
costt
B −1)+α2( costt−n:tn∗B −1)
]
(8)
where costt is the actual feedback cost of the current period,
B is the budget, costt−n:t and n∗B are the overall cost and
the overall budget of the most recent n periods. α1 and α2
are two learning rates. The main idea is when the actual cost
exceeds (is less than) the budget, the threshold CPRthr will
be increased (decreased) accordingly such that less (more)
users will be selected, which will reduce (increase) the cost
in turn. The first term α1( costtB − 1) is designed to keep up
with the latest changes. The second term α2(
costt−n:t
n∗B −1) is
designed to stabilize learning.
3.5. Action Space Reduction for RL in Advertising
However, when applying the RL approaches mentioned in
Section 3.2 to online advertising, one typical issue is that
the sample utilization is inefficient. The main reason is that
the action space of the agent is continuous, thus the range of
[0, bidmax] needs to be fully explored in all states. To resolve
this problem, we reduce the magnitude of the continuous
action space (i.e., at ∈ [0, bidmax]) to a binary one (i.e.,
ât ∈ {0, 1}) by making full use of the prior knowledge in
advertising, which greatly improves the sample utilization
of the RL approaches. Specifically, since different bids
at can only result in two different outcomes ât ∈ {0, 1},
where ât = 1 or 0 indicates whether the ad is displayed to
the user, we only have to evaluate the different expected
returns resulted by ât = 1 or ât = 0 for Q(s, a). We denote
the greedy action ât
∗ based on the current value estimations
as:
ât
∗ =
{
1 if Q(s, ât = 1) > Q(s, ât = 0)
0 otherwise (9)
Then, to obtain an executable bid, for ât
∗ = 0, we could
offer a low enough bid, e.g., at = 0, to make sure that it is
impossible to win the auction. For ât
∗=1, we propose an
optimal bid function which could output a bid greater than
the second highest bid while not overbidding.
In detail, we maintain two state-action value functions
QG(s, ât)=E[Gi|s, ât, pii] and QC(s, ât)=E[Ci|s, ât, pii].
Since the reward function is defined as rt = vt−CPRthr ∗ct,
we have Q(s, ât) =QG(s, ât)−CPRthr∗QC(s, ât). Then
Q(s, ât=1)>Q(s, ât=0) yields:
[QG(s, ât = 1)− CPRthr ∗QC(s, ât = 1)] >
[QG(s, ât = 0)− CPRthr ∗QC(s, ât = 0)]
(10)
If ât = 0, the expected immediate cost is 0 (since the ad
is not exposed). If ât = 1, we denote the expected im-
mediate cost as E[ct|ât = 1], whose value depends on the
pricing model. In online advertising, typical pricing mod-
els includes CPM (Cost Per Mille, the advertiser bid for
impressions and is charged based on impressions), CPC
(Cost Per Click, the advertiser bid for clicks and is charged
based on clicks) and CPS (Cost Per Sales, the advertiser bid
for conversions and is charged based on conversions). If
CPM is used, E[ct|ât = 1] = bid2ndt , where bid2ndt de-
notes the second highest bid in the auction. If CPC is
used, E[ct|ât = 1] = bid2ndt ∗ pCTR, where pCTR rep-
resents the predicted Click-Through Rate. If CPS is used,
E[ct|ât = 1] = bid2ndt ∗ pCTR ∗ pCVR, where pCVR
represents the predicted Conversion Rate. For ease of pre-
sentation, we take CPM for an example. Under CPM,
QC(s, ât = 1) = E[ct +
Ti∑
k=t+1
ck|s, ât = 1, pii]
= bid2ndt + E[
Ti∑
k=t+1
ck|s, ât = 1, pii]
QC(s, ât = 0) = 0 + E[
Ti∑
k=t+1
ck|s, ât = 0, pii]
(11)
Notice that the second highest bid bid2ndt is unknown until
the current auction is finished. Substituting Equation (11)
Dynamic Knapsack Optimization Towards Efficient Multi-Channel Sequential Advertising
into Equation (10), we acquire
bid2ndt <
[(
QG(s, ât = 1)
CPRthr
−QnextC (s, ât = 1)
)
−
(
QG(s, ât = 0)
CPRthr
−QnextC (s, ât = 0)
)] (12)
where QnextC (s, ât) = E[
∑Tj
k=t+1 ck|s, ât, pii]. We denote
the term on the right of the ’<’ in Equation (12) as b∗t . And
we conclude that the bidding agent can always set the bid
price at = b∗t during the online bidding phase, which is
the optimal action without any loss of accuracy. Refer to
Section B.2 of the Appendix for proof. For CPC or CPS,
the optimal bid formula b∗t can be easily acquired by sub-
stituting the corresponding E[ct|ât = 1] into Equation 11.
Here, we reaffirm that our action space reduction technique
is a generalized design and is applicable to different pricing
models.
4. Empirical Evaluation: Simulations
We start with designing simulation experiments to shed light
on the contributions of the proposed framework MSBCB
under more controlled settings. Similar to the simulation
settings of (Ie et al., 2019), we assume there are a set of
users {i = 1, ..., N}, a set of ads D and a set of commodity
categories T . Each ad d ∈ D has an associated category.
Each user i has various degrees of interests in commodity
categories, which is influenced by the displayed ad. When
user i consumes ad d, his interest in category T (d) is nudged
stochastically, biased slightly towards increasing his interest,
but allows some chance of decreasing his interest. We set
N = 10000, |D| = 2000 and |T | = 20 in the following ex-
periments. Detailed settings of the simulation environment
can be found in Section D of the Appendix.
4.1. Baselines
We compare our MCBCB with following baseline strategies:
• Myopic Approaches: (1) Manual Bid is a strategy that
the agent continuously bids at the same price initialized
by the advertiser. (2) Contextual Bandit (Zhang et al.,
2014) aims at maximizing the accumulated short-term
value of each request based on the Greedy framework.
• Greedy with maximized CPR: This approach is similar
to our method under the Greedy framework except that
each pii is optimized by maximizing the long-term CPR.
In the offline simulation, we enumerate all policies for
each user and select the one which could maximize its
CPR. This approach is named as Greedy+maxCPR.
• Greedy with state-of-the-art RL approaches: These
baselines, i.e., Greedy+DQN, Greedy+DDPG and
Greedy+PPO, utilize the same reward function with
our MSBCB to optimize the lower-level optimization
of Π. The difference is that our MSBCB leverages the
action space reduction technique. For DQN and PPO,
we discretize the bid action space [0, bidmax] evenly
into 11 real numbers as the valid actions.
• Undecomposed Optimization: These baselines are
RL approaches (DQN,DDPG and PPO) based on the
Constrained Markov Decision Process (CMDP). They
are named as Constrained+DQN, Constrained+DDPG,
Constrained+PPO respectively. We follow the CMDP
design and settings in (Wu et al., 2018).
• Offline Optimal: The optimal solution of the Dynamic
Knapsack Problem can be computed by dynamic pro-
gramming in offline simulation because we could enu-
merate all possible policies to get the corresponding
long-term values and costs for each user. Note that
since users’ request sequences are unknown before-
hand and there is only one chance for the ad to bid for
each request in the online advertising systems, the opti-
mal solution can only be obtained in offline simulation.
4.2. Experimental Results
We conduct extensive analysis of our MSBCB in the fol-
lowing 5 aspects. All approaches aim to maximize the
advertiser’s cumulative revenue under a fixed budget con-
straint. All experimental results are averaged over 10 runs.
The hyperparameters for each algorithm are set to the best
we found after grid-search optimization.
Figure 5. Values comparisons (learning curves) of the myopic ap-
proaches with non-myopic approaches and the offline optimal.
Myopic vs Non-myopic. To show the benefits of upgrading
the myopic advertising system into a farsighted one, we
compare the cumulative revenue achieved by our MSBCB
with two other myopic baselines. The learning curves and
results are shown in Figure 5 and Table 1. We see that MS-
BCB outperforms the Manual Bid and the Contextual Bandit
by a large margin, which indicates that taking account of
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the long-term effect of each ad exposure could significantly
improve the cumulative advertising results.
MSBCB vs the Offline Optimal. In Figure 5, we also
compare our MSBCB with the Offline Optimal, which is
computed by a modified dynamic programming algorithm.
We see that as the training continues, our MSBCB gradu-
ally achieves an approximately optimal solution. Detailed
results are summarized in Table 1. Our MSBCB empirically
achieves an approximation ratio of 98.53%(±0.36%).
MSBCB vs Greedy with maximized CPR. As discussed
in Section 3.1, under the Greedy framework, maximizing
each user’s CPRi cannot guarantee that the greedy solution
of the Dynamic Knapsack Problem (2) could be maximized.
The optimal advertising policy pii for each user is given
by Theorem 1. To experimentally verify the correctness of
Theorem 1, we compare the cumulative revenue achieved by
MSBCB and the Greedy with maximized CPR. As shown
in Figure 6 and Table 1, MSBCB outperforms Greedy with
maximized CPR and achieves a +5.11% improvement.
Figure 6. Value comparisons of MSBCB with the Greedy with
maximized CPR and the Greedy with state-of-the-art RL.
MSBCB vs Greedy with state-of-the-art RL approaches.
Besides, to show the effectiveness of the action-space reduc-
tion proposed in Section 3.5, we compare MSBCB with the
state-of-the-art DRL approaches under the Greedy frame-
work. As shown in Figure 6 and Table 1, MSBCB out-
performs Greedy+DQN, Greedy+DDPG and Greedy+PPO
both in the cumulative revenue and the convergence speed,
which shows that the action space reduction effectively im-
proves the sample efficiency of RL approaches.
Decomposed MSBCB vs Undecomposed optimization.
Similar to (Wu et al., 2018), the undecomposed optimization
baselines consider all users requests as a whole and model
the budget allocations among all request as a CMDP. As
shown in Figure 7 and Table 1, MSBCB outperforms the
CMDP based RL approaches by a large margin. The reason
of the poor performance in CMDP-based approaches is that
these methods model all users’ requests as a whole sequence
and thus the learning process is particularly inefficient. In
Figure 7. Values comparison (learning curves) of MSBCB and
state-of-the-art CMDP based RL approaches.
contrast, our MSBCB decomposes the whole sequence op-
timization into an efficient two-level optimization process,
thus can achieve better performance more easily.
Table 1. Cumulative values, costs, value improvements (over Con-
textual Bandit) and the approximation ratio of all approaches.
Method Revenue Cost Revenue Impro Approximation Ratio
Manual Bid 38838.28 11995.10 -48.31% 43.5%
Contextual Bandit 75137.30 11995.46 0% 84.15%
Constrained + PPO 61890.92 11954.07 -17.63±16.11% 69.31±13.56%
Constrained + DDPG 74259.12 11996.12 -1.19±3.66% 83.17±3.08%
Constrained + DQN 70662.65 11881.12 -5.96±7.83% 79.14±6.59%
Greedy + maxCPR 83668.70 11914.12 11.35±2.84% 93.70±2.36%
Greedy + PPO 76970.35 11825.59 2.44±3.52% 86.20±2.93%
Greedy + DDPG 80424.69 11841.28 7.04±1.13% 90.07±0.92%
Greedy + DQN 84117.09 11794.24 11.95±4.96% 94.21±4.14%
MSBCB 87947.99 11957.57 17.95±0.42% 98.50±0.33%
MSBCB (enum) 89251.77 11988.36 18.78% 99.96%
Offline Optimal 89291.11 11999.23 18.84% 100.00%
The complete comparisons of all approaches are shown in
Table 1. The budget constraint B is set to 12000 for all
experiments. In Table 1,we also add an MSBCB (enum),
which is the theoretical upper bound of our MSBCB. The
difference between MSBCB (enum) and MSBCB is that: the
MSBCB (enum) computes the optimal advertising policy pi∗i
for each user i by enumerating all possible policies. Instead
of utilizing the RL approach, MSBCB (enum) could find the
one which maximizes VG(i|pii) − CPRthr ∗ VC(i|pii). We
see MSBCB (enum) is very close to the optimal solution
and reaches an approximation ratio of 99.96%.
4.3. Effectiveness of Action Space Reduction
As shown in Table 2, MSBCB achieves a revenue of 75000
in only 61 epochs, reducing more than 60% samples com-
pared with the state-of-the-art RL baselines without using
the action-space reduction technique. As for learning pro-
cess, our MSBCB achieves the same revenue (80000) more
than 10 times faster than the baselines, reducing more than
90% samples and finally reaches the highest revenue. Thus,
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with the action space reduction technique, our MSBCB
could reach a higher performance with a faster speed and
significantly improve the sample efficiency. More analysis
of our MSBCB, e.g., the convergence of Π∗ and CPR∗thr, and
the hyperparameter settings of the offline experiments are
shown in Section D of the Appendix.
Table 2. The training epochs and the number of samples needed by
different approaches when achieving the same revenue level.
Revenue 75000 80000 85000
Method #Epoch #Samples #Epoch #Samples #Epoch #Samples
Greedy+PPO 817 4183040 - - - -
Greedy+DDPG 154 788480 853 4362240 - -
Greedy+DQN 373 1909760 754 3855360 - -
MSBCB 61 312320 71 363520 104 532480
5. Empirical Evaluation: Online A/B Testing
We deployed MSBCB on one of the world’s largest E-
commerce platforms, Taobao. Our platform is authorized
by the advertisers to dynamically adjust their bid prices for
each user request according its value in the real-time auction.
In the online experiments, we compare MSBCB with two
models widely used in the industry.
• Cross Entropy Method (CEM), which is a deployed
production model, whose target is to optimize the im-
mediate rewards. We consider CEM as the control
group in the following evaluations.
• Contextual Bandit, which has been explained in previ-
ous section and is reserved as a contrast test.
The experiment involves 135,858,118 users and 72,147 ad
items from 186 advertisers. For fair comparison, we con-
trol the consumers and the advertisers involved in the A/B
testing to be homogeneous. In detail, the 135,858,118 users
are randomly and evenly divided into 3 groups. For users in
group #1, all 186 advertisers adopt the CEM algorithm. For
users in group #2, all 186 advertisers adopt the Contextual
Bandit algorithm. For users in group #3, all 186 advertisers
adopt our MSBCB. Table 3 summarises the effects of the
Contextual Bandit and our MSBCB compared to the Cross
Entropy Method from Dec.10 to Dec.20 in 2019. From
Table 3, we see that our MSBCB achieves a +10.08% im-
provement in revenue and a +10.31% improvement in ROI
with almost the same cost (-0.20%). The results indicate that
upgrading the myopic advertising strategy into a farsighted
one could significantly improves the cumulative revenue.
Besides, as shown in Figure 8, the daily ROI improvement
also demonstrates the effectiveness of our MSBCB com-
pared with the Contextual Bandit.
Given that there are only 186 advertisers take part in our
online experiment, one frequently asked question is“How
Table 3. The overall performance comparisons of the A/B testing.
CVR represents the Conversion Rate of the users. #PV represents
the number of page views. ROI = RevenueCost means Return On Invest-
ment. (Notice that CEM is the control group and the improvements
of Contextual Bandit and MSBCB are compared over CEM.)
Method Revenue Cost CVR #PV ROI
Contextual Bandit +0.91% -3.26% +4.78% +4.62% +4.31%
MSBCB +10.08% -0.20% +6.04% +15.37% +10.31%
does the MSBCB work across all ads?” Since 186 is rela-
tively small compared with the total number of advertisers,
their policy updates would not cause dramatic changes to
the RTB environment. In other words, the RTB environment
is still approximately stationary from a single-ad perspec-
tive. This setting also works well with our practical business
model-providing better service for VIP advertisers (about
0.2% of all the advertisers). In the case that the majority
of the advertisers adopt MSBCB, the system cannot be esti-
mated as being stationary from any single-ads perspective
and explicit multi-agent modeling and coordination should
be incorporated. Detailed analysis of the improvement in
revenue for each advertiser is presented in Table 7 and Fig-
ure 19 of the Appendix. More details about the deployment
and experimental results (e.g., the online model architecture)
can also be found in Section C and E of the Appendix.
Figure 8. Daily ROI improvement comparisons of Contextual Ban-
dit and MSBCB over Cross Entropy Method.
6. Conclusion
We formulate the multi-channel sequential advertising prob-
lem as a Dynamic Knapsack Problem, whose target is to
maximize the long-term cumulative revenue over a period
of time under a budget constraint. We decompose the origi-
nal problem into an easier bilevel optimization, which sig-
nificantly reduces the solution space. For the lower-level
optimization, we derive an optimal reward function with
theoretical guarantees and design an action space reduc-
tion technique to improve the sample efficiency. Extensive
offline experimental analysis and online A/B testing demon-
strate the superior performance of our MSBCB over the
state-of-the-art baselines in terms of cumulative revenue.
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Appendix
A. Background of Online Advertising
Online advertising is a marketing strategy involving the use of advertising platform as a medium to obtain website traffics
and targets, and deliver marketing messages of advertisers to the suitable customers.
Platform. Advertising platform plays an important role in connecting consumers and advertisers. For consumers, it provides
multiple advertising channels, e.g., channels on news media, social media, E-commerce websites and apps to explore. For
advertisers, it provides automated bidding strategies to compete for consumers in all channels under the setting of real-time
bidding (RTB), in which advertisers bid for ad exposures and the exposures opportunities go to the highest bidder with a
cost which equals to the second-highest bid in the auction.
Consumers. Consumers explore multiple channels during the several visits to the platform within a couple of days. A
consumer’s final purchase of an item is usually a gradually changing process, which often includes the phases of Awareness,
Interest, Desire, and Action (AIDA) (Roberge, 2015). The consumer’s decision to convert (purchase a product) is usually and
has to be driven by multiple touchpoints (exposures) with ads. Each advertising exposure during the sequentially multiple
interactions could influence the consumers mind (preferences and interests) and therefore contribute to the final conversion.
Advertisers. The goal of advertisers is to cultivate the consumer’s awareness, interest and finally driving purchase. As
different ad strategies can affect consumers’ AIDA, an advertiser should develop a competitive strategy to win the ad
exposures in RTB setting. When the ad is displayed to a consumer, in Cost Per Click (CPC) setting, the advertisers should
pay commission to the platform after the consumer clicking the ad. When the consumer purchases the advertised item, the
advertiser will get the corresponding revenue.
The objective of an advertiser is usually to optimize the accumulated revenue within a time period under a budget constraint.
A strategy that maximizes short-term revenue of each ad exposure on different channels independently is obviously
unreasonable, since the final purchase is a result of long-term ad-consumer sequential interactions and the consumer’s visits
between different channels are interdependent. Therefore, the advertiser must develop a strategy to overcome following
two key challenges: (1) Find the optimal interaction sequence including interaction times, channels selection and channel
orders for a targeted consumer; (2) Choose targeted consumers and allocate predefined limited budget to them in multiple
interaction sequences.
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Figure 9. An illustration of the sequential multiple interactions (across different channels) between a user and an ad. Each ad exposure has
long-term influence on the user’s final purchase decision.
An example of a user’s shopping journey is shown in Figure 9. At time t1, a user visits the news media channel and triggers
an advertising exposure opportunity. Then, the advertising agent executes a display action and leaves an exposure on the
user. After that, the user becomes aware of and is interested in the commodity, so he clicks the hyperlink. Quickly, the
user is induced into the landing (detail) page of the commodity in the shopping app. After fully understanding the product
information, the user leaves the shopping app. After a period of time, the user comes back to the shopping app at time
Appendix
t4 and triggers an exposure opportunity of banner advertising. The advertising agent executes a display action as well.
Consequently, the users desire is stimulated. At time t6, the user makes a purchase. In this example, the ad exposure at
time t1 influences the users mind and contributes to the ad exposure at time t4 and the delayed purchase, which means
the ad exposure on one channel would influence the users preferences and interests, and therefore contributes to the final
conversion. Thus, the goal of advertising should maximize the total cumulative revenue over a period of time instead of
simply maximizing the immediate revenue.
B. Proof and Analysis
B.1. Knapsack Problem in Online Advertising Settings
Theorem 2. The greedy solution to the proposed dynamic knapsack problem of online advertising is λ approximately
optimal where λ > 99.9%
Proof. In the proposed online advertising problem, each user is with value VG (i.e. the profit of advertiser when the user
purchase the commodity) and weight VC (i.e. the total budget consumption for the target user in the real-time bidding to
reach the final purchase). As the item (i.e. user) is non-splittable, the proposed dynamic knapsack problem is essentially
a 0-1 knapsack problem which aims to maximize the total value of the knapsack given a fixed capacity B. For each
item, we can calculate the Cost-Performance Ratio (CPR) as VG/VC . Sort all items in descending order of CPR, i.e.
(VG1 , VC1) , (VG2 , VC2) , . . . , (VGn , VCn) where CPRi ≥ CPRj ,∀i ≤ j ≤ n. For VC > 0, VG > 0 and B > 0, we first
define that this 0-1 knapsack problem has optimal solution K∗(VC , VG, B) and greedy solution K(VC , VG, B) where K∗
and K represent the total value of the knapsack.
Assume Bend is the remaining budget after greedy algorithm, the following inequality holds:
B −Bend
B
K∗(VC , VG, B) ≤ K(VC , VG, B) ≤ K∗(VC , VG, B) (13)
This is because:
1) If the knapsack can hold all the items after the greedy algorithm, that is, the optimal solution is equal to the greedy
solution. As Bend ≥ 0, we have B−BendB K∗(VC , VG, B) ≤ K∗(VC , VG, B) = K(VC , VG, B)
2) If the knapsack cannot hold all the items after the greedy algorithm, as VG1VC1 ≥
VG2
VC2
≥ ... ≥ VGlVCl , we
have VGl
∑l−1
j=1 VCj ≤ VCl
∑l−1
j=1 VGj ⇔ VGl (B −Bend) ≤ VClK(VC , VG, B) ⇔
VGl
VCl
≤ K(VC ,VG,B)B−Bend ⇔
K(VC , VG, B) ≥ K∗(VC , VG, B) − BendK(VC ,VG,B)B−Bend where l is the index of last item picked by greedy algorithm.
This derivation can be simplified to K(VC , VG, B) ≥ B−BendB K∗(VC , VG, B).
In online advertising settings, the budget spent on a single user is much smaller than the advertiser’s total budget. We
conduct statistics on one of the world’s largest E-commerce platforms to prove it. On Feb 3rd of 2020, a total of 1136149
ads result in 983414548 user-ad sequences (a user sequence consists of multiple interactions of the same user with the same
ad), with an average of 865 user sequences per ad. Interactions with users of each ad forms a knapsack problem, where each
user sequence is an item in the knapsack. The average maximum budget consumed by each user sequence accounts for
0.07068% of the total budget capacity of the advertisers. We also list details of 5 ads with largest budget consumption in
Table 4, where the maximum budget consumed by each user sequence is much smaller than 1/1000 (smaller than 3/10000
specifically) of the total budget of each ad.
As proposed in Dantzig (1957), ∀i ∈ 1, 2, . . . , n, VCi ≤ (1 − λ)B, 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, the greedy algorithm achieves an
approximation guarantee of λ. We can conclude from above statistics that maxi
VCi
B ≤ 11000 , which means λ is much greater
than 1− 11000 .
The thesis above can be further proved:
1) If the knapsack can hold all the items after the greedy algorithm, that is, the greedy solution is obviously equal to the
optimal solution, which is also the λ approximately optimal solution.
Appendix
Ad #Users Sequences Budget Avg Cost (Avg Cost)/Budget Max Cost (Max Cost)/Budget
Ad 1 2460976 119352.51 0.048498039 0.0000406343% 20.04 0.0167905979%
Ad 2 2674738 114388.54 0.04276626 0.000037388% 26.22 0.0229218766%
Ad 3 2848816 90113.08 0.031631766 0.0000351023% 15.29 0.0169675701%
Ad 4 2107497 82951.82 0.03936035 0.0000474497% 5.6 0.0067509067%
Ad 5 1087011 77140.49 0.070965694 0.0000919954% 19.32 0.0250452130%
Table 4. Detailed Comparison between an ad’s total budget and cost on a user sequence.
2) If the knapsack cannot hold all the items after the greedy algorithm, we have VCl > Bend, that is,Bend < VCl ≤ (1−λ)B.
According to Formula 13, we have
K(VC , VG, B) ≥ B −Bend
B
K∗(VC , VG, B)
>
B − (1− λ)B
B
K∗(VC , VG, B)
= λK∗(VC , VG, B)
(14)
Therefore, in theory, the greedy solution in our online advertising settings is λ approximately optimal and the λ is much
greater than 99.9% in our case.
B.2. Regretless Optimal Bidding Strategy b∗t
Theorem 3. During the online bidding phase, the bidding agent can always set the bid price as:
b∗t =
[(
QG(s, ât = 1)
CPR∗thr
−QnextC (s, ât = 1)
)
−
(
QG(s, ât = 0)
CPR∗thr
−QnextC (s, ât = 0)
)] (15)
where QnextC (s, ât) = E[
∑Tj
k=t+1 ck|s, ât, pij ]. b∗t is a regretless optimal bidding strategy without any loss of accuracy.
Proof. Since bid2ndt is unknown until the current auction is finished, we prove the regretless of b
∗
t from the following two
cases:
1) If b∗t >bid
2nd
t : b
∗
t >bid
2nd
t ⇔Q(s, ât=1)>Q(s, ât=0), which means the agent should take action ât = 1 in this case.
Exactly, b∗t is greater than the second highest price bid
2nd
t based on the condition for entering the current branch. Thus,
the agent will always win the auction and the executed action is indeed ât = 1.
2) If b∗t ≤ bid2ndt : b∗t ≤bid2ndt ⇔Q(s, ât=1)≤Q(s, ât=0), which means the agent should take action ât = 0 in this case.
Exactly, b∗t is less than the second highest price bid
2nd
t according to the condition. Thus, the agent will always lose the
auction and the executed action is indeed ât = 0.
Thus, we complete the proof.
B.3. Convergence Analysis of MSBCB
The overall framework of MSBCB can be described as follows:
(1) Let the budget constraint of an advertiser be B. Given a CPRthr, we can use reinforcement learning algorithms to ensure
that each user i is optimized according to pi∗i := argmaxpii [VG(i|pii)− CPRthr ∗ VC(i|pii)] and converges to the optimal
policy pi∗i under the current CPRthr. Further, picking all users whose CPRi ≥ CPRthr will result in a total cost of B′ (i.e.,
the advertiser spends a budget B′).
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Figure 10. Convergence demonstration of MSBCB
(2) As the current estimated threshold CPRthr might have some bias from the optimal CPR∗thr, B
′ may not equal to the
budget B. Thus, we design a PID controller to dynamically adjust the estimated CPR∗thr so as to minimize the gap
between the budget constraint B and the actual feedback of the daily cost B′.
As described in Figure 10, MSBCB repeats the above two steps iteratively. Given an updated CPRthr, each pi will be
optimized by the lower-level reinforcement learning algorithms and pi will move towards the optimal pi∗. As a result, users
whose optimized CPRi ≥ CPRthr will be selected and we get the daily cost B′. Then, the current CPRthr will be updated so
that the gap between the cost B′ and the budget B will be further minimized. Thus, CPRthr will move towards the optimal
CPR∗thr gradually. As long as the learning rates of pi and CPRthr are small enough, the overall iterations will finally converge.
In this paper, we also validate the convergence of our MSBCB in the experiments. As shown in Section 4.2 of the paper, our
method converges quickly and finally reaches an approximation ratio of 98.53%.
C. Deployment
Here we give the online deployment details of our MSBCB.
C.1. Myopic to Non-Myopic Advertising System Upgrade Solution
Merger
RTP
Model Training
Training DataLog
PID Control
1 Request
2 Request 3 LTV, pCTR
4 Deliver Ads
5 Feedback
6 Auction Info
7 Budget Info
8 roi_thr
9 Feature
& LTV Label
10 Upload
    Data
11 Update Model
Figure 11. Online System
A myopic advertising system includes several key components as Figure 11 shows: (1) Log module collects auction
information and user feedback. (2) Training data are constructed based on log followed by model training with offline
evaluation. (3) Real-time prediction (RTP) module provides service for myopic value prediction of user-ad pairs. RTP
periodically pulls newly trained models. (4) Merger module receives the user visit, requests RTP for myopic value with
which ad bid adjustment ratios and ranking scores are calculated (In advertising, ranking score is ecpm = pCTR ∗ bid
where pCTR is predicted Click Through Rate and bid is the bidding price). Finally, top-scored ads are delivered to the
user. Above myopic advertising system can upgrade to a non-myopic system by considering the following key changes.
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(1) Log module needs to keep long-term auction information and users’ feedback, and these data are used to construct
features and long-term labels for training. Besides, logged data have to track each advertised item’s budget and current
cost data which are fed to a PID control module to compute CPRthr for users selection in Merger. (2) Model training can
use Monte Carlo (MC) or Temporal Difference (TD) methods. For MC, the long-term labels are cumulative rewards of a
sequence and the training becomes a supervised regression problem. For TD, one-step or multi-step rewards are used to
compute a bootstrapped long-term value using a separate network for training. (3) RTP module should periodically pull both
myopic and non-myopic newly trained models and provide corresponding value prediction service. (4) Merger maintains an
< item,CPRthr > table which is updated periodically from PID module. When a user visit comes, Merger requests RTP for
both pCTR and long-term values (long-term GMV i.e. VG and cost i.e. VC in our paper), and with CPRthr decides the
selection of current user and bid adjustment.
C.2. Long-Term Value Prediction Model
Figure 12. Long-Term Value Prediction Model
C.2.1. FEATURES AND LABELS
Features for long-term value prediction should contain sufficient user’s static profile and historical behavior information.
Most myopic advertising systems already have a sound feature system which can summarize user-oriented, ad-oriented and
user-ad interactive history very well. Besides, due to the large amount of data collected by the online advertising system,
these features are able to generalize across large number users where each user-ad pair’s interaction is considered as a
separate MDP, thus, help the prediction model learning. To be specific, the state st at step t includes: 1) user profile features;
2) user behavior features; 3) real-time user behavior features; 4) context features; 5) user-ad interaction histories; 6) user
feedback before current step t and so on. Features are constructed based on past 7-14 days data before user visit time t. For
the MC training method, labels are constructed using the following 7 days data after user visit time t. For the TD method,
labels are the instant rewards at time t and the long-term labels are constructed using a bootstrap method.
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C.2.2. MODEL ARCHITECTURE
The long-term value model architecture is shown in Figure 12, where the model takes the features as input and output
long-term value of GMV (i.e. VG in our formulation) and cost (i.e. VC in our formulation) for both action=1 (display the
ad) and action = 0 (do not display the ad).
We use one model to output multiple long-term values (GMV and cost for action=1 and action=0). Multiple prediction
tasks share the same bottom layers because we consider the underlying knowledge of the user’s sequence behaviors such
as opening the app, jumping across channels, turning off the phone and revisiting the app should be learned together and
shared. The shared layer converts input features to embeddings and embeddings in the same group are concatenated. The
user-behavior group embeddings are then pooled with sum operation. User-profile embeddings, user-behavior embeddings,
candidate ad embeddings, and real-time features are finally concatenated and flattened as the output of the bottom layers.
Following the shared bottom layers, the network is split into two forward-pass branches where one is for long-term GMV
prediction and one for long-term cost prediction. We find this two-branch design can reduce the influences among different
tasks and stabilize the learning. For the long-term GMV prediction, since each user usually buys a commodity only
once, we only have to predict P (buy > 0|feature) denoted as CTCV R. In the online inference phase, the long-term
GMV is computed with GMV = P (buy > 0|feature) ∗ item price where item price is the price of the commodity.
For the long-term cost prediction, in CPC (Cost-Per-Click) advertising, a user usually clicks several times before buys
and the cost per click along with each click varies, thus, the long-term cost prediction cannot be decomposed as the
long-term GMV prediction and the only way is to regress the long-term cost value. However, as most sequences’ costs
are zero, the direct regression learning process will be very noisy. Therefore, we design an additional hidden layer to
compute P (cost > 0|feature), P (cost = 0|feature) and E(cost|cost > 0, feature). Then, the predicted long-term
cost is computed as pcost = P (cost > 0|feature) ∗E(cost|cost > 0, feature) +P (cost = 0|feature) ∗ 0 = P (cost >
0|feature)∗E(cost|cost > 0, feature) where P (cost > 0|feature) and P (cost = 0|feature) are learned using logistic
regression loss and pcost is learned using mean-square error loss (pcost− cost)2. We find the above designs help improve
the model’s prediction performance in practice. For CTCV R and P (cost > 0|feature), P (cost = 0|feature), we use
GAUC (Zhou et al., 2018) as metric, and for pcost regression, we use mean-square error and reverse order metrics.
D. Empirical Evaluation: Supplementary of Offline Experiments
D.1. Experiments Settings.
Considering the potential losses of assets and money, it’s usually forbidden to do a lot of trial and error and thoroughly
comparisons between available baselines in a live advertising system. Thus we implement a fairly general simulation
environment so that we could make extensive analyses of our approach. All experiments are conducted on an Intel(R)
Xeon(R) E5-2682 v4 processor based Red Had Enterprise Linux Server, which consists of two processors (each with 16
cores), running at 2.50GHz (16 cores in total) with 32KB of L1, 256 KB of L2, 40MB of unified L3 cache, and 128 GB of
memory and 2 Tesla M40 GPUs.
D.2. Simulation Environment.
Here, we give the detail of the simulation environment. Similar to (Ie et al., 2019), the simulation environment includes the
following 5 modules:
• Advertisements and Topic Model: We assume a set of documents D representing the content available for advertising.
We also assume a set of topics (or users interests) T that capture fundamental characteristics of interest to users; we
assume topics are indexed 1, 2, ...|T |. Each commodity d ∈ D has an associated topic vector d ∈ [0, 1]|T |, where dj is
the degree to which d reflects topic j. Each document d ∈ D also have an inherent quality Qd ∈ [0, 1], representing the
topic-independent attractiveness to the average user.
• Consumer Interest and Satisfaction Model: Each user i has various degrees of interests in topics, ranging from 0 (com-
pletely uninterested) to 1 (fully interested), with each user i associated with an interest vector u ∈ [0, 1]|T |. Consumer
i’s interest in advertisement d is given by the dot product I(u, d) = ud. We assume some prior distribution Pu over
user interest vectors, but user i’s interest vector is dynamic, i.e., influenced by their advertisement consumption (see
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below). Besides, a user’s satisfaction S(u, d) with a consumed (viewed) advertisement d is a function f(I(u, d), Qd)
of user i’s interest and ad d’s quality. Here, we assume a simple convex combination S(u, d) = (1− α)I(u, d) + αQd.
Satisfaction influences user dynamics as we discuss below.
• Consumer Choice Model: The user’s Click-Through Rate (CTR) and Conversion Rate (cvr) are represented by I(u, d)
and S(u, d) respectively. Each user has the probability of clicking and buying an advertising commodity according the
CTR and CVR.
• Consumer Dynamics: We assume that a user’s interest evolves as a function of the documents consumed (viewed).
When user i consumes document d, her interest in topic T (d) is nudged stochastically, biased slightly towards increasing
her interest, but allows some chance of decreasing her interest. In this paper, we set u← γu + β ∗ S(u, d) ∗ d, where
γ is the interest decay rate and β ∈ [−1, 1] is a user independent parameter.
• Consumer Visiting Model and Advertising System Dynamics: The users’ request sequence are generated from a stable
distribution Preq. For each user’s request, all advertisements d ∈ D give a bid and competes with other bidders in
real-time. The winner has the privilege to display its ad to the user, which could further influence the user’s interest and
behavior.
D.3. Codes and Datasets.
The codes and datasets to reproduce our offline experiments are provided in another supplementary material.
D.4. Cost Comparison.
The consumption of budget during the training process is shown in Figure 13. As we can see, the costs of all approaches
converge to about 12000, which is exactly equal to the budget we set in experiments. Specific costs of each approach can be
found in Table 1 of paper.
Figure 13. The learning curves of costs of our MSBCB and the other baseline approaches.
D.5. Convergence Analyses
D.5.1. CONVERGENCE OF EACH pi∗i GIVEN ANY CPRTHR .
As shown in Figure 14, given a CPRthr, the learned advertising policy pi of our MSBCB converges to the optimal pi∗j . In
Figure 14, the x-axis denotes the cumulative cost, the y-axis denotes the cumulative value and the dots in blue represent
the cumulative values and costs of all possible policies for each user. The red line represents y = CPRthr ∗ x, whose slope
is CPRthr. The orange point represents the optimal policy pi∗i computed by enumerating all possible policies (blue points)
and finding the one which maximize VG(i|pii) − CPRthr ∗ VC(i|pii) according to Theorem 1. The green point denotes
the learned policy of MSBCB. In theory, the point of the optimal policy is the one whose CPR > CPR∗thr and vertical
distance is the farthest from the red line. A proof is provided in the Theorem 4 in the later part. We present 3 convergence
examples of different types in Figure 14. In Figure 14 (a) and (b), the learned pi by the RL algorithm is exactly the same
with the optimal pi∗. In Figure 14 (b), the optimal policy is do not advertise to this user. In Figure 14 (c), the learned pi is
Appendix
approximately optimal. Detail convergence statistics on the proportion of users whose policies converged to the optimal
(a) user #1’s learned policy. (b) user #2’s learned policy. (c) user #3’s learned policy.
Figure 14. Three examples of the convergence of each pi∗i given a fixed CPRthr.
ones among all users are shown in Table 5. For each user, we denote the vertical distance of the learned policy to the
CPR∗thr line as dis
∗
learned and the vertical distance of the optimal policy pi
∗ to the CPR∗thr line as dis
∗
optimal. We denote
R∗opt = dis
∗
learned/dis
∗
optimal as the approximation ratio. According to Theorem 4, if the R
∗
opt is 100%, then the learned
strategy is exactly the optimal strategy. Otherwise, we denote that the learned strategy is the R∗opt-approximation strategy.
As shown in Table 5, there are 74.9% policies achieve more than 90%-approximation ratios and 53.3% policies achieve
exactly the optimal.
Table 5. Optimal types of each pi∗i of 10000 users
R∗opt 100% [90%, 100%) [0%, 90%)
Percentage 53.3% 21.6% 25.3%
Theorem 4. The point of the optimal policy is the one whose CPR > CPR∗thr and vertical distance to CPR
∗
thr line (red line)
is the farthest among all policy dots in Figure 14.
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Figure 15. Proof of Optimal Policy Dot
Proof. Here we give a simple proof of Theorem 4. As we can see in Figure 15, the blue dot D : (xi, yi) is an arbitrary policy
i in Figure 14. Suppose the vertical distance ofD toCPR∗thr line (red line) is ∆yi (segmentDC in the figure). We then draw
a vertical line of x-axis from dot D to dot B. We can then calculate the length of segments: OB = xi, BA = xi ∗ CPRthr,
DA = yi − xi ∗ CPRthr. It’s evident that4OAB ∼ 4DAC, which means DCOB = DAOA = DA√(OB)2+(AB)2 . We can derive
that
∆yi
xi
=
yi − xi ∗ CPRthr√
x2i + (xi ∗ CPRthr)2)
(16)
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As xi > 0, we can further derive that
∆yi =
yi − xi ∗ CPRthr√
1 + CPR2thr
(17)
Suppose the dot of a policy is (x∗, y∗), which has farthest vertical distance ∆y∗ from the CPR∗thr line, that is, for a dot of
arbitrary policy i, we have ∆yi ≤ ∆y∗. According to Equation 17, we have
yi − xi ∗ CPRthr√
1 + CPR2thr
≤ y
∗ − x∗ ∗ CPRthr√
1 + CPR2thr
(18)
Then we get yi − xi ∗ CPRthr ≤ y∗ − x∗ ∗ CPRthr, which means (x∗, y∗) is the dot of the optimal policy. Thus, we
complete the proof.
D.5.2. CONVERGENCE OF CPR∗THR .
In Figure 16, we plot the learning curves of the CPRthr of our MSBCB as well as 3 RL approaches. The dotted blue line
denotes the optimal CPR∗thr computed by the MSBCB (enum) of Table 1 of paper. Figure 16 shows that the learned CPRthr
of our MSBCB could gradually converge to the optimal CPR∗thr approximately, which is much better than the other 3 RL
approaches.
Figure 16. The convergence of CPR∗thr
D.6. Gap to Market Second Price.
Figure 17 shows average gaps between the bid of the agent of different approaches and the second price in the auction.
Results indicate that the bid prices given by the MSBCB agent are closer to the second price in the auction, which can reduce
the risk of economic loss when the market price fluctuates.
D.7. Effectiveness of Action Space Reduction.
Here we give a more detailed comparison of MSBCB and RL baselines to demonstrate the effectiveness of action space
reduction. As shown in Figure 18 and Table 6, MSBCB (with action space reduction) can reach exactly the same cumulative
value much more quickly than the other 3 RL baselines. MSBCB can reach a cumulative value of 85000 in only 104 epochs,
which proves that action space reduction can effectively improve the sample utilization to converge to higher performance
with faster speed.
E. Empirical Evaluation: Supplementary of Online A/B Testing
In online A/B Testing, we conduct further analyses to verify the effectiveness of our MSBCB and find out whether our
approach could benefit most advertisers.
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Figure 17. The average gaps of the bids to the second prices in the auction by different methods.
Table 6. The training epochs and the number of samples needed by different approaches when achieving the same revenue level.
Cumulative Value 60000 65000 70000 75000 80000 85000
Method #Epoch #Samples #Epoch #Samples #Epoch #Samples #Epoch #Samples #Epoch #Samples #Epoch #Samples
Greedy + PPO 251 1280000 299 1530880 776 3973120 817 4183040 - - - -
Greedy + DDPG 68 343040 76 389120 92 471040 154 788480 853 4362240 - -
Greedy + DQN 90 455680 109 558080 153 783360 373 1909760 754 3855360 - -
MSBCB 22 112640 33 163840 48 245760 61 312320 71 363520 104 532480
Firstly, we analyze the performance of our MSBCB for each advertiser. To guarantee the statistical significance, only the
advertisers with more than 100 conversions in a week are included. The detail results of top-10 advertisers with the largest
costs are shown in Table 7. In Table 7, under the same budget constraint, our MSBCB can increase the Revenues and ROIs
of most advertisers compared with the myopic Contextual Bandit approach. Although the ROI of advertiser 7 drops slightly,
our MSBCB contributes to much more PVs (Page Views).
Besides, in Figure 19, we give the detail proportions of advertisers whose ROIs are improved. Among all advertisers, 85.1%
advertisers obtain positive ROI improvements while the rest of 14.9% advertisers are in the so-called quantity and quality
exchange situations: their PV increments are larger than the ROI drops. We say that its also acceptable for some advertisers
because the PV increments might lead to secondary exposures to an advertiser and thus lower the ROI within the current time
period. But the increase in PV may leave deeper impressions to the users and contribute to the long-term future revenues. In
addition, Figure 19 demonstrates that our MSBCB can be well applied to the multi-agent setting (which involves multiple
advertisers) in the real-world auction environment, which could increase the overall revenue for most advertisers.
In order to highlight the advantage of our method in long-term revenue optimization, we compared the average number of
Figure 18. The comparison of the number of training episodes needed by different approaches when achieving the same revenue level.
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Revenue Cost CVR PV ROI
Advertiser 1 5.1% -6.3% 17.2% 9.6% 12.2%
Advertiser 2 7.5% 2.1% 5.2% 12.2% 5.3%
Advertiser 3 48.6% 10.9% 27.6% 28.9% 33.9%
Advertiser 4 3.1% 2.8% 1.1% 9.6% 0.3%
Advertiser 5 12.7% 1.7% 12.9% 17.8% 10.8%
Advertiser 6 10.8% 2.2% 4.4% 13.8% 8.4%
Advertiser 7 1.9% 3.8% 4.6% 31.5% -1.8%
Advertiser 8 5.6% -4.8% 2.9% 10.7% 11.1%
Advertiser 9 6.7% -2.4% 6.3% 21.0% 9.4%
Advertiser 10 5.8% -0.8% 2.5% 8.0% 6.7%
Table 7. The improvements in Revenue, CVR, PV and ROI of our MSBCB compared with the myopic Contextual Bandit method.
Figure 19. The distribution of ROI improvements for all advertisers of our MSBCB compared with the myopic Contextual Bandit method.
times (we call the sequence length) that a user contact with an advertisement under different approaches. Figure 20 shows
the extent of MSBCB’s improvement relative to Contextual Bandit in the proportion of the user sequence length. The results
show that our MSBCB can increase the proportion of the sequences with larger sequence length. Especially, the ratio of
sequence length of 7 is increased by nearly 30%. It shows that our method can promote longer user behavior sequences, and
longer user behavior sequence means more opportunities to affect the user’s mentality towards an advertisement, thereby
improving the long-term revenue for an advertisement.
Figure 20. The proportion improvements in the sequence length of our MSBCB compared with the myopic Contextual Bandit method.
Further, we also analyze the ROI performances of the compared 3 algorithms (i.e., CEM, Contextual Bandit and our MSBCB)
in different channels. Figure 21 shows the budget allocation distributions of all approaches among 6 channels and the
corresponding ROIs. The left axis represents the ROI, and the ROI performances of each algorithm among different channels
are given by the corresponding bar charts. The right axis represents the increments or decrements of the actual costs of
MSBCB and Contextual Bandit relative to CEM, which are indicated by the line charts. In Figure 21, we observe the
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Figure 21. ROI and budget allocation among different channels.
following two phenomena:
1) MSBCB and Contextual Bandit both spend more budgets on channels with higher ROIs, especially on the Payment
Successful channel, where the average ROI is much higher.
2) Compared with Contextual Bandit, MSBCB allocates more budget from the Guess What You Like channel to other
channels, especially the Favorites channel, Confirmed Receipt channel and the Payment Successful channel.
These phenomena show that our MSBCB can reasonably allocate budgets among different channels and spend more budgets
in channels with higher ROIs. In addition, compared with the myopic method Contextual Bandit, our long-term MSBCB
is more optimistic about channels during and after purchasing, which shows that our MSBCB prefers a longer interaction
sequence to optimize cumulative long-term values.
